We measure the degree of supply-induced demand in newborn treatment by exploiting changes in reimbursement caused by the introduction of the partial prospective payment system (PPS) in Japan. Under the partial PPS, Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) utilization became relatively more pro…table than other procedures, since it was excluded from the prospective payment. We …nd that hospitals respond to PPS adoption by increasing NICU utilization and increasing their manipulation of infants'reported birth weight, which determines infants' reimbursement and maximum length of stay. This induced demand substantially increases hospitals'reimbursements without improving infant health.
Introduction
Economists and policy makers have long argued that medical providers "induce"demand of health services by exploiting their informational advantage over patients and providing excessive care of dubious value (Evans 1974 , Fuchs 1978 , Pauly 1980 , Rice 1983 . 1 Since medical providers exert a strong in ‡uence over the quantity and types of medical care demanded, measuring the size of supply-induced demand (SID) has been a long-standing controversy in health economics (McGuire 2000) . While there are numerous empirical studies on SID, they …nd surprisingly little evidence of SID; the estimated magnitudes are often insigni…cant or economically small. 2 However, these past studies may underestimate the size of SID for two reasons: First, it is empirically di¢ cult to isolate SID from other confounding hospital behaviors, such as changes in the selection of patients (Ellis and McGuire 1996) . Estimates of SID will be biased towards zero if hospitals select unobservably healthier patients for a given treatment intensity. Since it is di¢ cult to control for the severity of patients' conditions, selection bias poses an important empirical challenge in this literature. 3 Second, most of the past literature focuses on medical procedures that carry large risks for both physicians and patients, such as Caesarean sections (Gruber and Owing 1996, Grant 2009 ) or coronary artery bypass graft surgeries (Yip 1998) . SID may be less likely for these high-risk procedures, since physicians face a higher probability of lawsuits if they perform them excessively and must persuade patients to consent.
We overcome these empirical challenges by focusing on speci…c population: at-risk newborns.
Selection is less of a concern for the treatment of newborns, especially low birth weight infants, because the birth weight and severity of the newborns' conditions are di¢ cult if not impossible to predict in advance (Almond et al., 2010) , even though we later show suggestive evidence of slight birth weight manipulation. In addition, newborn treatment allows substantial room for demand inducement, since the informational advantages of physicians over patients are arguably among the largest. 4 We also focus on a less risky medical procedure: Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) utilization. NICU utilization is of particular interest since it contains minimal risks for both patients and physicians. Additional days in the NICU do not harm newborns and may even bene…t them. 5 There are two key institutional features that make Japan a nice setting for estimating supplyinduced demand of NICU utilization. First, Japan introduced a partial prospective payment system (PPS), which made NICU utilization relatively more pro…table than other procedures, since it was excluded from the per-diem prospective payment and was fully reimbursed. Since hospitals adopted the PPS at di¤erent times, we use a di¤erence in di¤erence framework to estimate the e¤ect of relative changes in price on demand. Second, because NICU utilization is costly, the government caps the number of NICU days for which hospitals are reimbursed. Lighter births are allowed longer stays, and the cap changes discontinuously at the birth weight cut-o¤s of 1000 and 1500 grams. 6 The jump in the cap means that hospitals' scope for increasing NICU utilization and their incentives for manipulating birth weights substantially di¤er by the range of infants' birth weights. Adoption of the PPS, which increases the relative pro…tability of NICU utilization, only increases their …nancial incentives for gaming.
Our focus on at-risk newborns and less risky medical procedures uncovers strong evidence of supply-induced demand. First, we …nd evidence that hospitals manipulate reported birth weights;
there is an increased mass of birth weights that are reported just below the cut-o¤s of 1000 and 1500 grams, which only occurs in hospitals with NICUs and is exacerbated after the introduction of PPS. We run the density test proposed by McCrary (2009) and …nd that there is statistically signi…cant heaping at just below these cut-o¤s after the adoption of PPS. We do not have any objective measure of newborns'health besides mortality and cannot link mothers'information to the birth data, so it is di¢ cult to distinguish whether this sorting is the result of benevolence (e.g., physicians mis-recording the birth weights of sicker infants who weigh more than the cut-o¤ so that these infants receive necessary treatment) or gaming (e.g., hospitals mis-recording birth weights to obtain higher reimbursements for NICU utilization). However, since we see exacerbated manipulation after the introduction of PPS, we suspect it is more likely to be gaming.
Second, we …nd that the hospitals increase NICU utilization in response to the adoption of PPS. Most interestingly, we only …nd the increase in NICU stays among Very Low Birth Weight infants (VLBW; birth weighing less than 1500 grams) infants, for whom there is more scope for increasing utilization. In fact, we …nd that after the adoption of PPS, NICU stays of VLBW newborns increase by 4.8 days, an 11.2 % increase relative to NICU stays before the adoption of PPS. This result is robust to a variety of the robustness checks, such as the inclusion of a lead dummy and hospital-speci…c linear trends. We also rule out alternative explanations than SID.
For example, we …nd no evidence that the characteristics of low-birth weight babies changed or transfers of newborns increased after PPS was introduced.
Finally, there is also little evidence that the induced increase in NICU stay reduced infant mortality, suggesting that the marginal increase in NICU utilization had little impact on newborns'health. The increase in NICU stay translates into an increase in hospitals'reimbursement by roughly 489,000 Yen ($5,400) per VLBW newborn. This increased reimbursement for NICU utilization can result in an additional medical expenditure of as much as 10.6 trillion Yen ($117 million), without any observable improvements in short-term infant health outcomes. 7 In addition to the literature on supply-induced demand, our paper also contributes to the literature on hospital gaming. Dafny (2005) divides hospital responses to price changes into two categories: nominal and real responses. Nominal responses correspond to accounting maneuvers (e.g., upcoding diagnoses) while real responses correspond to actual increases in the provision of care. Unlike Dafny (2005) , which …nds evidence of only nominal responses but not real responses to changes in diagnosis-speci…c prices, we …nd evidence of both nominal (i.e., manipulation of birth weight) and real (i.e., longer stays in NICU) responses.
Our results can also inform the reimbursement policies for newborn treatment in other coun-7 All …gures in the dollar term are measured in 2009 US dollar throughout this paper. All price in Yen is de ‡ated by CPI to 2009 Japanese Yen, and then converted to US dollars by the exchange rate of 90 Yen per US dollar. 4 tries. Since birth weight is believed to be the best predictor for the treatment intensity of newborns, other countries are increasingly using it to determine the reimbursement level for newborn treatment (Quinn 2008) . For example, a few states in the US have already incorporated birth weights into the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) reimbursement schedules for state Medicaid programs. 8 Our results caution against the use of the birth weights in the reimbursement system, since hospital gaming may become severe under higher stakes. Newborn treatment is also expensive in other countries, and some have questioned the e¤ectiveness of these increasingly intensive treatments (Grumbach, 2002; Goodman et al., 2002) while others have argued that bene…ts outweigh costs (Cutler and Meara 2000; Almond et al 2010) . Our results may suggest that we have reached the " ‡at-of-curve medicine" in newborn treatment in Japan, where one of the lowest infant mortality rates in the world has been achieved at a relatively low cost (Ikegami and Campbell 1995) . 9 Japan o¤ers a nice empirical setting to examine the existence and size of SID for a number of reasons. First, under universal health insurance, medical providers in Japan are all paid through the same national fee schedule, which is uniformly applied regardless of patients'insurance type.
Thus, we can easily measure the monetary size of the SID. Second, there is a little room for costshifting in Japan because all citizens are covered by the mandatory universal health insurance. 10 In contrast, in the US, the introduction of DRG/PPS on Medicare led hospitals to charge higher prices for private insurers (Cutler 1998) . 11 Third, physicians' incentives are more likely to align with hospitals' incentives since in Japan, physicians in the hospitals are all employed by the hospitals, unlike in the US, where the physicians and hospitals are separate entities. This fact is important to detect SID, since for SID to occur, physicians must be willing to provide excess care, and the administrators must submit these claims for payment. 8 Modi…ed versions of original DRG, such as All Patient DRGs (AP-DRGs), and All Patient Re…ned DRGs (APRDRGs) incorporate birth weight in their groupings of diagnoses for reimbursement. For example, the AP-DRGs is used in DC, GA, IN, NY, VA, WA, and the APR-DRGs is used in MD. See Quinn (2008) for details.
9 For example, the life expectancies at birth in Japan and the US are 82.6 and 78.1 in 2006, and the infant mortality rates (deaths per 1,000 live births) in Japan and US are 2. 6 and 6.7, receptively (OECD, 2009 ). On the other hand, the ratio of medical expenditures to GDP in Japan is lowest among the OECD countries. In 2006, the ratio of total expenditures on health to GDP was 8.1 in Japan, 11.0 in France, 10.5 in Germany, 9.0 in Italy, 8.5 in the United Kingdom, and 15.8 in the United States.
1 0 Japan achieved universal health insurance policy in 1961. See Kondo and Shigeoka (2011) for more details about introduction of universal health insurance and its impact.
1 1 See also McGuire and Pauly (1991) for economic model of physician behavior with multiple payers. This model can be viewed as single payer buying multiple services as in our case.
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The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes background on the reimbursement system and the treatment of newborns in Japan. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents the identi…cation strategy. Section 5 shows the birth weight distribution and discusses manipulation of birth weight. Section 6 shows the main results on NICU utilization, and Section 7 examines health outcomes, and measures the monetary size of the induced demand. Section 8 concludes.
Background
In this section, we brie ‡y describe the reimbursement system and the treatment of newborns in Japan.
Reimbursement system in Japan: FFS to partial PPS
Before the introduction of the PPS, the medical providers in Japan were all paid by a fee-for-service system (FFS). The national fee schedule for procedures was uniformly applied to all Japanese patients, regardless of their insurance type and medical providers. 12 However, medical expenditures in Japan have been rising, largely due to the aging, at a faster rate than any other developed countries.
To contain the rising medical expenditures, the Japanese government implemented its unique PPS, which bases payment on the patient's Diagnosis Procedure Combination (DPC) (similar to PPS based on Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) in the US), and partially replaces the conventional FFS. 13 The PPS based on DPC (DPC/PPS hereafter), is designed as a way of reimbursement for hospitals for acute inpatient care. The government started it in 82 hospitals, mostly university hospitals in April 2003. Since this new payment system is revenue-neutral for each hospital for the time being, it has expanded at a rapid rate to most acute hospitals, even though the par-1 2 See Ikegami (1991 Ikegami ( , 1992 and Ikegami and Campbell (1995) for detailed descriptions of the medical system before the implementation of PPS in Japan. The national schedule is biennially revised by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) through negotiation with the Central Social Insurance Medical Council (CSIMC), which includes representatives of the public, payers, and providers.
1 3 There is extensive empirical literature on the e¤ect of the introduction of PPS for Medicare bene…ciaries in the US. See Coulam and Gaumer (1991) and Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) for reviews. ticipation in the PPS was only mandatory for the …rst 82 hospitals. 14 Therefore, one potential concern is that the adoption of PPS is endogenous to outcome of interest. While we show that predetermined hospital characteristics explain little of the variation in the timing of adoption, to assuage this concern, we include interactions of these hospital characteristics with time trends in all our regressions to control for di¤erences in trends across hospitals, similar to Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004) . We also conducted a variety of robustness checks to account for concerns about potential endogenity of the adoption such as the inclusion of a lead dummy and hospital-speci…c linear trends. We discuss this more in detail in the estimation section.
The Hospital fee and doctor fee
A unique feature of the health care system in Japan is that the physicians who work in hospitals are employed by the hospitals, unlike in the US. Therefore, when the government designed the PPS, it divided medical procedures into two categories, which are referred to the "hospital fee"and "doctor fee." The procedures considered under the "hospital fee" (hereafter, hospital-fee procedures) are paid under a per-diem prospective payment, while procedures considered under the "doctor fee" (hereafter, doctor-fee procedures) are paid by the conventional fee-for-service system. 15 The former includes medical procedures that are relatively standardized across hospitals, such as bed use, diagnostic imaging, injections, and medications. Procedures that re ‡ect technical work by physicians are considered doctor-fee procedures, a major component of which are surgeries. 16 The idea behind this distinction is that hospitals could easily reduce medication expenditures by replacing brand names with generics, but the avoidance of the necessary surgeries may result in huge adverse outcomes.
For newborn treatment, in addition to surgeries, one additional procedure is excluded from 1 4 More precisely, the per-diem …xed payment is multiplied by a hospital update factor, which is unique to each hospital (See Okamura et al. (2005) for details). This hospital update factor is calculated so that the hospital may receive the same revenues as in a prior year as long as hospitals see the same case-mix of patients as a year before. Hospitals were afraid that failure to adopt PPS could jeopardize their status as acute care hospitals. Acute hospitals are considered more advanced and prestigious than chronic disease hospitals, and thus, they attract more patients in Japan. In fact, some hospitals publicize on their websites that they are reimbursed by DPC/PPS. 1 5 Because of the per-diem instead of per-admission payment and assignment of the DPC based on types of surgeries, and medication, in addition to diagnosis, this payment system is not completely prospective. But the retrospective nature of diagnosis classi…cations is also applied to DRG in the US (Zweifel et al, 2009) . 1 6 Relatively complicated, technological procedures such as endoscopic inspection and anesthesia are also exempted from the per-diem …xed payment. the per-diem …xed payment: NICU utilization. NICU utilization is excluded from the hospital-fee procedures since it requires a substantial workload by physicians and because there is a concern that reducing NICU utilization could have adverse e¤ects on at-risk newborns.
This partial PPS can substantially a¤ect the behavior of the hospitals since it makes the doctor-fee procedures relatively more lucrative than the hospital-fee procedures. This substitution e¤ect is substantial since while hospitals are still fully reimbursed for the former, while hospitals need to bear any additional costs incurred for medical treatments for latter. In sum, this partial PPS gives hospitals the …nancial incentives to perform the doctor-fee procedures, including NICU, intensively while reducing hospital-fee procedures if possible.
Newborns treatment in Japan
A Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) is a hospital unit that specializes in the care of premature, low birth weight or severely ill newborns. They are developed to provide better temperature and respiratory support, isolation from infection risks, and specialized feeding for vulnerable newborns. 17 The development of NICU has been thought to be one of the main contributors to the decline in death rate of at-risk newborns (Lee et al. 1980; Kliegman 1995; Phibbs et al. 1996; and Phibbs et al. 2007 ).
However, NICU utilization is very costly in Japan as well as other countries. Hospitals are reimbursed 85,000 Yen ($944) for each additional night in the NICU. 18 Since the average NICU stay of newborns with birth weights less than 1500 gram is 43 days, hospitals are reimbursed as much as 3,655,000 Yen ($40,600) per newborn for NICU utilization alone. Since mothers of low birth weight infants (speci…cally those less than 2000 grams) are mostly exempted from payment under the national policy in Japan, this large charge is almost all paid by the government.
The government acknowledges its concern over over-utilization of NICU. Thus the maximum number of the days that hospital can claim the reimbursement for NICU utilization is set by the 1 7 The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) establish requirements for hospitals that claim the reimbursement for NICU utilization. For example, these hospitals must have at least one neonatologist for all day, and possess emergency resuscitation equipment (endotracheal intubation set), a cardio-respiratory monitor, arti…cial ventilation for infants, micro-infusion device, pulse oximeter, and photoradiation therapy equipment.
1 8 The amount of reimbursement slightly di¤ers by the characteristics of the hospitals but they are very similar.
8 birth weight, since birth weight is believed to be the best predictor of requiring NICU utilization.
Speci…cally, these limits are 21 days for newborns above 1500 grams, 60 days for those between 1000 and 1500 grams, and 90 days for those less than 1000 grams. The jump in number of the maximum days is important in our setting since the room for additional claims for NICU utilization substantially di¤ers by the range of birth weight. Figure 1 shows a histogram of the number of days in NICU for each birth weight range (above 1500 grams, between 1000 and 1500 grams, and below 1000 grams, respectively) before the PPS is introduced. Two things are noticeable. First, for any birth weight range, there is some bunching at the maximum days that the hospitals can claim the reimbursement for NICU utilization. Second and more importantly, infants with birth weights over 1500 grams have the most bunching at the maximum days. This implies that there is less room for longer claims of NICU for birth weights more than 1500 grams than for birth weights less than 1500 grams.
Data

Description and sample selection
The main data are the insurance claim data for in-hospital births that are delivered and discharged between April and December 2004-2008. 19 This is the …rst paper in economics to use this data. 20 Since hospitals that were not acute or chronic care hospitals wanted to join this new payment system, which was designed for the acute care hospitals, the government set an eligibility criterion for hospitals joining after 2006: they were required to submit data for the two years of data prior to joining. Thus, there is no pre-PPS data for the hospitals that adopted PPS before 2004 in our data.
Because the national fee schedule sets uniform prices for each procedure, Japanese insurance claim data includes price information for each procedure, and, therefore, we are able to measure 1 9 Exception is year , the data was collected from April to October. As a robustness check, we limit the sample to the birth between April and October to be consistent across years, but the main results are quantitatively unchanged. Data submission is only required for these months in early years to reduce hospitals'burden of compiling the data. For the …scal year of 2010, hospitals had to submit the whole year of data.
2 0 This data set has previously been exclusively used for medical research (e.g., Kuwabara and Fushimi (2010) ).
the monetary size of any inducement. This is di¤erent than the US, where the payment methods used to reimburse hospitals are notoriously complex and frequently incomplete.
We extract the data in the following manner: First, we extract in-hospital births for the 188 hospitals that claimed at least one day of NICU utilization. 21 Second, we merged pre-treatment hospital information from 2002, and dropped the one hospital for which this information was missing, since it opened after 2002. Finally, we limit the sample to the births weighing less than 2000 grams for following reasons: First, under national policy, mothers of infants weighing less than 2000 grams are mostly exempted from payment of newborns treatment, so there are no incentives for mothers to limit over-utilization. Second, we only observe births that are covered by health insurance in our data; while all births weighing less than 2000 grams are covered by health insurance, the only births weighing over 2000 grams that are covered by health insurance are those with severe complications. 22 Thus, births weighing less than 2000 grams in our data are a more nationally representative sample of births (conditional on weighing less than 2000 grams).
Indeed the birth weight distribution for birth weights less than 2000 grams in our sample is very similar to that nationally. 23 The …nal sample size for the 187 hospitals we study is 13,408, which is 85.3% of the total number of 15,725 births weighing less than 2000 grams. One concern may be whether births are transferred from non-NICU hospitals. However, only eight percent of births in non-NICU hospitals are transferred to these NICU hospitals, and we also con…rmed that the number of transfers from non-NICU hospitals to NICU hospitals did not changed after PPS was introduced. 24
Outcome variables
The three key outcome variables for NICU utilization are a NICU utilization dummy, which equals one if the hospital claims at least one day for NICU utilization for the newborn; a variable for the number of NICU days claimed, conditional on NICU utilization; and a dummy for whether the newborn reached the maximum number of NICU days allowed for his birth weight. 25 The …rst variable corresponds to the extensive margin, and the second corresponds to the intensive margin of NICU utilization. For health outcomes, we create a dummy variable for whether the infant dies within 7 days, 28 days, and 90 days. However, the infant mortality rate is quite low in Japan and also because of the small sample size, these health outcomes are not precisely estimated. 26 Table 1 summarizes the key variables in the data. The summary statistics are grouped by the year that hospitals adopted the new payment system. The simple comparison before and after adoption of the PPS for the NICU days shows that hospitals that adopted the new payment system shows that roughly one third of the reimbursement comes from hospital-fee procedures and the two thirds come from the doctor-fee procedures, which mainly come from the NICU utilization. Figure 2A is the graphical presentation of the regression analysis of NICU utilization. We plot the average length of stay in NICU for newborns which stay at least one day in NICU for each 100 gram interval before and after the PPS. To avoid a composition e¤ect caused by hospitals' di¤erential timing of PPS, we only use one year before and one year after the adoption of PPS for hospitals for which we have both pre and post PPS data. There are two things worthwhile to mention. First, the number of days in NICU di¤ers substantially at the birth cut-o¤s both pre and post PPS. For example, before PPS is introduced, the jump in NICU days at 1500 grams is roughly 15 days between infants below 1500 grams and above 1500 grams, and that at 1000 grams is a similar magnitude. Due mainly to this increase in NICU days at the birth cut-o¤s, the total reimbursement measured by national fee schedule also jumps discontinuously at these birth cut-o¤s in Figure 2B . 27 Second, we …nd a sizable increase in NICU days only for births weighing less than 1500 grams after PPS is adopted. This result is consistent with Figure 1 because there is more room for longer claims below 1500 grams, since many of the births above 1500 grams already reach the maximum days.
Estimation 4.1 Estimation equation
Since the PPS is introduced at times at the hospital level, I use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence strategy to estimate the e¤ect of PPS on the supply of medical procedures:
for newborn i, hospital h, at time t. Y iht is the outcome, such as NICU days, mortality and total reimbursement. t represents a full set of year dummies, and h stands for a full set of the hospital …xed e¤ects. X iht is a vector of the newborn characteristics such as birth weight, gestational length and gender. P ost ht is a dummy that equals one if hospital h is under the new payment system at time t. Finally, iht is a random term that captures all omitted variables. The main coe¢ cient of interest is .
There are …ve di¤erent hospital groups in the data that adopted the new payment system at di¤erent times, speci…cally in 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2009 
Adoption of PPS
One potential concern is whether the adoption of PPS is exogenous. Participation in the PPS was only mandatory for the …rst 82 hospitals, mainly university hospitals, that adopted PPS in 2003.
Many hospitals followed because the DPC/PPS is revenue-neutral for each hospital. In fact, as of 2009, it has expanded to 1,428 hospitals. Therefore, one potential concern is that participation to the PPS is endogenous with the use of NICU. But it is important to note that if hospitals want to exploit the revenue-neutral nature of the PPS, those hospitals should increase treatment intensity in the year prior to the adoption of the PPS, since this is the base year for which the hospital update factor to guarantee the previous year's revenue is calculated. However, these strategic behaviors would make it more di¢ cult for us to …nd a result, since hospitals may reduce treatment intensity to increase the pro…t once PPS is adopted. Also, the hospital update factor is computed based on the hospital-fee procedures only, which do not include NICU utilization.
Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that government hospitals tended to adopt later, since they often needed approvals from municipal legislature. Table 1 NICU beds and without NICU beds. To see the contrast between before and after the PPS is introduced, we limit the sample to treatment hospitals, since they have data both before and after the adoption of PPS. Due to the small sample size, we aggregate the frequency within 20 gram intervals for NICU hospitals and 50 grams for non NICU hospitals due to small sample size of the latter group. The two vertical lines correspond to 1000 grams and 1500 grams, where the number of the days that hospitals can claim reimbursement for NICU utilization jumps substantially. Figure 3A shows that there is clearly heaping just below 1000 and 1500 gram cut-o¤s for both before and after PPS among NICU hospitals, but larger heaping after PPS. We observe the heaping just left of 1000 gram and 1500 gram threshold while we observe the heaping just right of most of every other 100 grams threshold due to the rounded reporting at every 100 grams, which are included in the right bin of these thresholds in the histogram.
More formally, we run the density test proposed by McCrary (2009) using the birth weight as a running variable. We …nd that there is statistically signi…cant jump at both 1000 gram and 1500 gram after PPS. Figure 4 shows the result of the McCrary's test for post PPS among NICU hospitals. We use the pilot bandwidth of 100 gram with the binsize of 10 gram. The log di¤erence in distribution at 1500 grams is -0.84 (t= -2.68), and 1000 grams is -0.45 (t= -2.28) for post PPS. Table 3 shows that these results are robust to the di¤erent binsize and bandwidth choices. Also we do not see any statistically signi…cant jumps at any of other multiples of 100 grams. These results show that heaping at just below 1000 gram and 1500 gram is not driven mechanically at round numbers as a result of common scale resolutions. For pre PPS, even though we visually see slight heaping, it is not statistically signi…cant at either of the two cuto¤s.
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Manipulation?
We argue that this heaping is indeed the result of the manipulation of reported birth weight for following reasons. First, Figure 3B shows that such heaping is not observed among non NICU hospitals. Second, since we focus only on in-hospital births, this result is not driven by receiving transfers from other hospitals that are just below the birth weight cuto¤s or sending transfers to other hospitals that weigh slightly more than the birth weight cuto¤s. Third, our results are not driven by uniqueness of our insurance claim data since we …nd the same heaping among all births in Japan. We obtained the universe of births in Japan for 1995, 2000, and 2005 from the vital statistics. In Figure A1 in Appendix, we see the obvious heaps even among universe of births for any year of data. 30 The results of McCrary's density test on this data are summarized in Table   A1 in Appendix. 31 This manipulation per se is of particular interest since this result is very di¤erent from Almond et al. (2010), which did not …nd such a sorting at 1500 gram birth cut-o¤ in the US birth data, while they found pronounced reporting heaps at the gram equivalents of one ounce intervals. A recent paper by Barreca et al. (2010) shows that this heaping in birth weight in US data is found to be systematically correlated with socio-economic characteristics. On the other hand, Bharadwaj and Neilson (2011) show that heaping at the 10, 50 and 100 gram intervals in birth data from Chile, which, like Japan, measures birth weights in grams, are correlated with mother's characteristics. 32 Since we do not have any objective measures of newborns' health besides mortality 33 , and cannot link mothers'information to the birth data, it is di¢ cult to distinguish whether this sorting 3 0 Unfortunately, vital statistics don't have hospital information as well as mother's socioeconomics status to examine the characteristics of the sorting.
3 1 We do not observe any statistically signi…cant or economically large heaping at just below 2000 grams for the universe of births either (available from the authors upon request).
3 2 Indeed, we could also potentially use the jump in the NICU days at these birth weight thresholds to examine the e¤ect of NICU on the health outcomes in the RD framework akin to Almond et al. (2010) and Bharadwaj and Neilson (2011) . However, if the unobserved quality of the hospitals or physicians is correlated with the manipulation of birth weight, this may violate the identi…cation assumption of RD that birth below and above the cuto¤ is random. Also more importantly, even without the issue of manipulation, the mortality rate, which is the best objective health outcomes available in our data, is very low in Japan and also the sample size is not large enough to precisely estimate its e¤ect in the RD framework. Therefore we do not seek the approach in this paper.
3 3 For example, the diagnosis may be endogenous. Since they are coded by the physicians, they are also potentially driven by the same economic factors determining the NICU utilization. If physicians are going to manipulate the birth weight to reap …nancial reward, they must indicate a diagnosis that justi…es the use of this expensive unit. Many studies have documented such "coding" within the context of Medicare's PPS (Dafny 2005, Silverman and Skinner 2004) .
is the result of benevolence (e.g., physicians mis-recording the birth weights of sicker infants which weigh more than the cut-o¤ so that these infants receive necessary treatment) or gaming (e.g., hospitals mis-recording birth weights to obtain higher reimbursements for NICU utilization). 34 However, since we see exacerbated manipulation after the introduction of PPS, we suspect the latter story …ts better in this setting.
It is important to note, however, that the degree of manipulation does not seem substantial considering the size of the …nancial reward that hospital can reap. 35 For example, if the hospitals manipulate birth weights that are just above 1500 grams to just below 1500 grams, the maximum number of the NICU days that hospital can claim di¤ers by 39 days (60 minus 21). This di¤erence leads to a maximum of roughly 3,315,000 Yen (85,000 Yen/day*39 days or roughly $36,800) of additional reimbursement for hospitals. But we still see some observations just above these cuto¤s. 36 This small magnitude of sorting may indicate the di¢ culty of the manipulating birth weights. 37 However, it is plausible that the manipulation may become severe if the stakes get high enough. Indeed, Figure A1 and Table A1 shows that magnitude of manipulation is larger in later years, especially in 2005 after PPS is introduced. More attention should be paid on manipulation of birth weight, since a handful of states in the US now uses modi…ed version of original DRG that incorporates birth weight in their grouping of diagnosis and reimbursement for states Medicaid plan.
Since the degree of manipulation is not substantial, our di¤erence-in-di¤erence regressions in the following sections are not sensitive to exclusion of births near the birth weight cuto¤s. We include them in all the regressions results reported below.
3 4 We are not aware of any other programs in Japan that uses both 1000 grams and 1500 grams birth weights as cuto¤s. One could explore this issue by examining the degree of manipulation by hospital ownership type (Duggan 2000) . Due to the small sample size, we cannot detect any di¤erences by ownership types.
3 5 Discussions with physicians indicates that it is possible that physicians or nurses weigh the newborns several times and report the lowest birth weight, knowing the di¤erential reimbursement just below the cut-o¤s. However, they also mentioned that they could manipulate birth weights a maximum of 10-20 grams using this method.
3 6 To gauge the rough magnitude of this manipulation, we count the number of births in the range of 10 grams around 1500 gram cut-o¤s using the universe of births in 2005 ( Figure A1 -C in the Appendix). The number of births weighing between 1490 and 1499 grams is 181, while between of 1500-1509 gram is 104. If we simply assume that birth from the above the cuto¤ are moved to below the cut-o¤ within this range, the implied shift of birth is around 43 per year, which is (189-104)/2. Since the additional revenue by shifting one baby is $36,800, the total cost for the government is US $1,582,400. Similarly, the number of births between 990 and 999 grams is 108, and that of 1000-1009 grams is 55, which implies the shift of 27 births.
NICU utilization 6.1 Regression results
Our main estimation results on NICU utilization are shown in the Table 4 . The …rst three columns present the result for NICU use, a dummy that equals one if the newborn stays at least one day in NICU. Since NICU utilization is high even before PPS, we estimate it using a Probit model. 38 We do not …nd that hospitals use NICU more often after the introduction of PPS (column 1). We divide the sample into births weighing more than 1500 grams (column 2) and less than 1500 grams (column 3), but the estimates are not statistically signi…cant in either cases.
The next three columns in Table 4 present the results on the NICU days, the number of the days that hospitals claim on the NICU utilization conditional on at least one day in NICU. Column 4 shows that the newborns stay 2.83 days longer after the adoption of the PPS. Column 5 and 6 in Table 4 show that the results are largely driven by birth weights less than 1500 grams. While birth weights more than 1500 gram stay 0.56 days longer on average (not statistically signi…cant), birth weights less than 1500 grams stays 4.77 days longer. Since average length of stay in NICU for birth weights less than 1500 gram is 46.0 days on average before the PPS, this increase corresponds to 10.4 % increase of NICU days.
We then investigate whether the probability that the newborns reach the maximum number of the NICU days set by the birth weight range increases in the last three columns in Table   4 . However, for overall, as well as any birth weight range, the estimates are not statistically signi…cant. For example, birth weighing less than 1500 grams that stay at least one day in NICU is 14.2 percentage points more likely to reach the maximum days after PPS, even though it is far from statistically signi…cant at the conventional level (t= 0.65). These results indicate that hospitals may increase the length of NICU stay for all births.
Robustness checks
In this subsection, we examine robustness of our result to three other explanations. First, we examine further the concern of endogenity of the adoption in PPS; second, we examine the possibility that newborns that are born after the adoption of PPS are sicker. Finally, we investigate whether our result is driven by a mere increase of supply of NICU beds. Overall, none of the alternative explanations is su¢ cient to account for our results. Since we …nd the largest e¤ect on NICU days for birth weights less than 1500 grams, we focus on this group in the following analysis. Table 5 shows the results. To make the results comparable with our basic results, column 1 in Table 5 reports the estimated coe¢ cients from the basic speci…cation.
Endogenity of participation
Before estimating a number of speci…cations, Figure 5 shows the results of an event-study analysis where we replace the policy dummy in equation (1) by the series of the dummies for each year from the adoption of PPS. Due to data limitations, we only have two years of data before implementation of the PPS. The outcome is NICU days and we focus on births weighing less than 1500 grams. Figure 5 shows that there is no pre-trend before the PPS is implemented, and a substantial jump of around …ve days after the implementation. This result is reassuring since we can rule out the possibility of strategic behavior a year before the implementation of PPS, and mitigates the concerns over the endogenity of the implementation of PPS.
The event study analysis in Figure 5 mitigates the concerns of the endogenity of the implementation of PPS since we do not observe any pre-trend. Nonetheless, we further take two di¤erent approaches to show that our results may not be driven by the endogenity of the hospital participation in PPS. First, we include a lead dummy which equals one just prior to the year when hospitals join the new payment system. Speci…cally, it is one for year 2005 for the hospitals that adopted new payment system in 2006, and one for year 2007 for the hospitals that adopted it in 2008, and zero otherwise. This inclusion of the pre-period dummy is often used to investigate the reliability of di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation (for example, see Acemoglu and Finkelstein 2008) , and serves as a speci…cation test to see whether there are any di¤erential trends in the variable of interest before the introduction of policy change. For instance, if the hospitals exploit the revenue-neutral nature of the PPS, hospital would have increased its treatment intensity just prior to the adoption of PPS. The lead dummy should capture such a behavior. Column 2 in Table 5 shows that including lead dummy does not change the magnitude of the coe¢ cients from the main result in column 1. Also the size of the "lead"dummy is small in magnitude compared to the main variable of interest, and is not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels.
Second, we include a hospital linear time trend to capture pre-existing time trends that are speci…c to each hospital. If there is a strategic behavior mentioned above, the hospital speci…c linear trend may capture it to some extent. This speci…cation is the most stringent form among all speci…cations since it leaves little variation in the variables of interest. Column 3 shows that the coe¢ cient on post dummy is still statistically signi…cant at the 10% level even in this most stringent form of regression, and in fact the magnitude of the coe¢ cient gets even larger (7.00 days). 39 Overall, there seems a little concern that endogenity of the participation in PPS is driving our results on NICU utilization.
Sicker newborns
Another interpretation for our results is that the newborns after the PPS are sicker and thus these newborns need more intensive care. It is hard to imagine a sudden change in the distribution of the birth weight and severity among low birth newborns since the birth weight and severity of the newborns is not easy to predict in advance and, the number of low birth weight newborns does not change drastically within a few years. Nonetheless, there is a possibility that the PPS induce the hospitals to focus on the treatment of diagnosis that hospitals have highest cost e¢ ciency (Dranove 1987) . If this leads to the concentration of sicker babies in the hospitals that adopted the PPS speci…cally in 2006 and 2008, our results could be spurious.
To examine the possibility of change in birth distribution, we collapse the full data (before extracting the births weighing less than 2000 gram) at the hospital-year level, and we regress the number of births weighing less than 2000 gram as well as the ratio of the births weighing less than 2000 gram among all the births observed in our dataset on the post PPS dummy. The estimate on the number of births is -1.66 (p-value 0.431), and ratio is 0.0037 (p-value 0.719). 40 These results
show that the distribution of the low birth weight newborns did not change within hospitals after the adoption of PPS.
Also even though we are aware of that there is a potential concern that diagnosis coding is endogenous (Dafny 2005, Silverman and Skinner 2004) , we include the three main ICD10 diagnosis (short gestation, respiratory distress syndrome (RDS), and birth asphyxia), and three main complications (retinopathy of prematurity, patent ductus arteriosus, and nutritional de…ciency) in Column 5 and Column 6. The coe¢ cient on post dummy does not change much. We also run the same estimation using the birth weight and the gestational length, which are observable birth characteristics in our data, as outcomes, to examine whether the newborns are di¤erent after adoption of PPS. However, there is little evidence on that newborns are sicker in terms of observable characteristics (available from the author upon request). As a supplement to the analysis here, Table A2 in the Appendix examines the delivery method in the sample hospitals among all births as well as births with less than 34 weeks of gestation, which corresponds to the mean gestational length for birth less than 1500 grams since we don't have birth weight in the delivery data. 41 It is reassuring that we don't see any increase in the delivery method that can be associated with the high risk of newborns such as emergency Caesarean sections.
Increase in Supply of NICU beds
Finally, it is possible that increase in NICU days merely re ‡ects an increase in the availability of NICU beds, which Pauly (1980) calls an "availability e¤ect." Unfortunately, we do not have yearly data on the number of the NICU beds. 42 However, we can identify hospitals that opened 4 0 The standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. 4 1 Since the unit of observation in this data is delivery of mother instead of the infants born, we only have gestational length but not the birth weight of infants.
or closed the NICU beds from the information on whether the hospitals claim NICU utilization at least one day in the year. It is plausible to assume that if the hospitals have NICU beds, the beds should be utilized. By this method, we …nd that there are 8 hospitals in our data that started claiming for the reimbursement for NICU utilization and 7 hospitals that stopped it. We exclude these 15 hospitals and run the same main speci…cation. Column 7 shows that coe¢ cient on post dummy does not change. Therefore our results are not driven by the mere change in supply of the hospitals that opened or closed the NICU beds. Also it is important to note that hospitals cannot easily increase or decrease the number of NICU beds. The hospitals also need to increase the equipment and sta¤ to meet government requirements for NICUs.
Health outcomes and the size of the induced demand
The remaining two questions are whether longer stays in NICU had any observable health impacts, and what would be the monetary value of these medical procedures. Table 6 investigates the …rst question by examining mortality. We should take the mortality results with caution, though, because the mortality rate is quite low in Japan and due to the small sample size, the e¤ect on mortality is not precisely estimated. 43 Also, we cannot track postdischarge mortality, so at best these are short-term health outcomes. Table 6 shows the results for 7-day, 28-day, and 90-day mortality, but we do not …nd any evidence as expected that mortality changes after PPS is adopted, partly because mortality rate is very low in Japan. 44 On the other hand, there is suggestive evidence that a longer stay in NICU may not a¤ect the mortality obtained by comparing the results between length of stay in NICU and the total length of stay in the hospital. Total length of stay (TLOS) in hospital may serve as the summary measure of the sickness of the newborns, and hence treatment intensity. The …rst row in Table 7 shows that TLOS increases by 1.82 day for all births weighing less than 2000 grams and 1.93 days for 4 3 For example, see Itabashi et al. (2009) for very low mortality rate in Japan among Extremely Low Birth Weight Infants (births weighing less than 1000 grams). 4 4 We also look at deaths within 24 hours, 3-day, and 60-day, but none of them are statistically signi…cant.
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births weighing less than 1500 grams, but neither of these is statistically signi…cant. This indicates that while the length of stay in NICU increases by roughly …ve days for birth weighing less than 1500 grams, TLOS does not increase as much. This result is plausible, since staying longer in normal hospital beds may not be pro…table to hospitals, especially beyond the national average of TLOS, since the average per-diem …xed payment is declining as the newborns stay longer. 45 In the second row in Table 7 , we also examine the number of surgeries, which may also serve as a measure of treatment intensity. It is important to note that even simple procedures such as blood transfusions and tapping of the lungs are recorded as "surgeries"in Japan, since they require any skills of physicians. We excluded blood transfusions from our measure of surgeries. We do not observe any statistically signi…cant changes in this variable either.
Size of the induced demand
As this induced demand results in no observable improvement on infants'health, the next question is what is the size of this induced demand? Since we have data on price for each procedure calculated under national fee schedule, we can run the main speci…cation using the reimbursement for NICU as a dependent variable. Table 8 presents the size of inducement for NICU utilization.
For births weighing less than 1500 grams, the increase in reimbursement for longer stays in NICU is 489,000 Yen ($5,400). 46 Since the average reimbursement for births weighing less than 1500 grams before the introduction of PPS was 5,176,700 Yen ($57,500), this increase corresponds to 9.5% increase in reimbursement.
We also investigated whether there is any change in treatment intensity of other medical procedures, as measured by price of national fee schedule. It is possible that increase in NICU is the result of a reduction in necessary medical procedures included in the hospital-fee procedures.
Also, it is possible that we may observe an increase in surgeries, another major component that are excluded from the hospital-fee procedures. Table 9 investigates these possibilities. In sum, we did not see any change in other medical procedures. This result may indicate that hospitals or physicians cannot reduce or increase the medical procedures that can potentially lead to adverse health outcomes.
Since the reimbursement under the PPS is designed to be revenue-neutral for each hospital for hospital-fee procedures (so in principle, the government cannot save money on hospital-fee procedures), this increase in the reimbursement for NICU utilization in doctor-fee procedures can be taken as the magnitude of the additional reimbursement incurred by the implementation of new payment system. Or taken di¤erently, this amount is an additional cost to society which does not result in any observable improvement in the short-term health outcomes of infants. If all the other hospitals behave the same way as the hospitals observed in this data, this increase in the reimbursement for the NICU utilization can result in additional medical expenditure of as much as 10.6 trillion Yen ($117 million). 47
Conclusion
The title of Phelps's (1986) "Induced demand: can we ever know its extent?", still remains as a question today. In this paper, we focus on at-risk newborns to examine evidence on the size of the supply-induced demand. At-risk newborns are less subject to selection bias, since the birth weight and severity of newborns' conditions are often di¢ cult to predict in advance. Also, we focus on NICU utilization, which is arguably less harmful to patients than previously studied procedures, like Caesarean sections.
We …nd that the hospitals increase the number of days in NICU in response to a policy change that makes NICU utilization more pro…table than other medical procedure. Also, we did not …nd any evidence that this marginal increase in NICU utilization had an impact on newborns health.
This increase in inducement translates into additional reimbursement of 489,000 Yen ($5,400) per newborn for births weighing less than 1500 grams. If we take this …gure literally, the increase in reimbursement can lead to an additional social cost of 10.6 trillion Yen ($117 million) without any observable improvement in health outcomes.
Even though our results may be only applied to a speci…c case of at-risk newborns, this research may indicate that we may observe much larger supply-induced demand if we could mitigate the selection bias and focus on less risky medical procedures such as NICU.
One limitation of this paper is that since we only focus on particular patients (at-risk newborns), our results do not capture the overall response of the hospitals to the introduction of the PPS.
For example, it is plausible that hospitals may make pro…ts on newborn treatment to compensate for losses in the treatment of other diagnoses, such as cancer, in response to adoption of PPS.
While it is di¢ cult to compare the severity of the patients across hospitals and thus to identify diagnoses for which hospitals have the highest cost e¢ ciencies (Dranove 1987) , future research should examine whether hospitals devote resources di¤erentially to such diagnoses. Note: The maximum days for birth more than 1500 gram, more than 1000 but less than 1500 gram, and less than 1000 gram, are 21, 60 and 90 days, respectively. The data used here are newborns during pre PPS period at the hospitals that adopted the PPS in 2006 and 2008 (treatment hospitals). Note: The two vertical lines correspond to 1000 and 1500 grams, where the maximum number of the days hospitals can claim reimbursement for NICU utilization differs. The maximum days for birth more than 1500 grams, between 1000 and 1500 grams, and less than 1000 grams, are 21, 60 and 90 days, respectively. The three horizontal dotted lines in Figure A are these maximum days for each birth range. The total reimbursement in Figure B is calculated based on national fee schedule. We converted Yen to US 2009 dollar to make it comparable with Figure  3A in Almond et al. (2010) , which draws similar graph for the US. Exchange rate of 90 Yen per US dollar is used.
To avoid a composition effect from hospitals that adopted the PPS at different timings, this graph uses data from one year before and one year after the adoption of PPS for hospitals that adopted in 2006 and 2008. The bin size is 100 g. There are 4,684 observations in total. Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the hospital level. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Post is a dummy that equals one if hospital is under the new payment system and zero otherwise. Lead is a dummy that equals one a year prior to the adoption of the PPS, and zero otherwise. All specifications include the year fixed effects and hospital fixed effects. Controls are birth weight, gestational length, and a male dummy. In addition to fixed effects and controls, we include 2002 hospital characteristics (number of beds, ownership of the hospital, a dummy for teaching hospital, level of hospital care (primary, secondary and tertiary), a dummy that takes the value of one if hospitals have an ER section, and a dummy that takes the value of one if hospitals have mandatory hospital within the same Health Service Area) each interacted with a linear time trend. Table 5 for detail. Figure 4 , I use the pilot bandwidth of 100 gram with the binsize of 10 gram. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Each row corresponds to a separate OLS regression. The estimate on post is reported. Post is a dummy that equals one if hospital is under the new payment system and zero otherwise. All specifications include the year fixed effects and hospital fixed effects. Controls are age, age-squared, and multiple birth dummy. In addition to fixed effects and controls, we include 2002 hospital characteristics (number of beds, ownership of the hospital, a dummy for teaching hospital, level of hospital care (primary, secondary and tertiary), a dummy that takes the value of one if hospitals have an ER section, and a dummy that takes the value of one if hospitals have mandatory hospital within the same Health Service Area) each interacted with a linear time trend. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the hospital level. Significance level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
